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INTRODUCTION 
n a cross-border contract, courts and arbitral tribunals 
are required to determine the applicable law—also known 
                                                                                                             
* First Secretary of the Hague Conference on Private International Law 
(Netherlands); Part–time Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Ant-
werp (Belgium). Parts of this article are extracted from previous publications 
authored by the Permanent Bureau as well as a contribution by Marta Per-
tegás: Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Contracts, in 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MICHAEL BOGDAN (Juristförlaget, 2013). 
I
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as the governing law—to resolve disputes arising out of it. The 
ability of the parties to choose the applicable law is justified by 
reference to the classical principle of party autonomy. 
Inspired by Kant, party autonomy is the bedrock of the mod-
ern law of contract. In the early twentieth century, however, 
the use of party autonomy in an international context was a 
highly contentious issue on both sides of the Atlantic.1 Scholars 
and judges alike were divided as to the ability of contracting 
parties to exalt themselves above the otherwise applicable law 
by exercising their liberty and preferring another law. Scholars 
such as Mancini and Rabel were joined by courts in France, 
England, and the United States of America in their support for 
the principle. Among its skeptics were Beale on one side of the 
Atlantic, and Batiffol and Niboyet on the other. 
Over the course of the twentieth century, as international 
trade increased, and indeed in the twenty-first century with 
the rise of globalization, the principle of party autonomy in con-
flict of laws has garnered greater support. Party autonomy is 
considered to be the most practical solution for conflict of laws 
in international contracts2 and reigns, or ought to reign, subject 
to certain clearly defined limits. Although many jurisdictions 
commit in principle to party autonomy, this commitment does 
not often translate into practice.3 Many jurisdictions also call 
                                                                                                             
† Senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Comparative and Interna-
tional Private Law (Germany). This co-authored article formed the basis of a 
presentation by Marta Pertegás at the Brooklyn Law School Symposium, 
“What Law Governs International Commercial Contracts? Divergent Doc-
trines and the New Hague Principles,” 18 October 2013. 
1.  See generally JEAN-PAULIN NIBOYET, La Théorie de l’Autonomie de la 
Volonté (1927) 16 Recueil des Cours 1; PETER NYGH, AUTONOMY IN 
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 8–13 (1999); Gisella Rühl, Party Autonomy in the 
Private International Law of Contracts: Transatlantic Convergence and Eco-
nomic Efficiency, in CONFLICT OF LAWS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD (Eckart
Gottschalk, et al. eds., 2007). 
 2. Andrew Dickinson, Third–Country Mandatory Rules in the Law Appli-
cable to Contractual Obligations: So Long, Farewell, Auf Wiedersehen, 
Adieu?, 3 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 53, 59 (2007).
 3. Jürgen Basedow, Theorie der Rechtswahl oder Parteiautonomie als 
Grundlage des Internationalen Privatrechts, 75 RABELSZ 33 (2011); MARY 
KEYES, PARTY AUTONOMY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford University 
Press (forthcoming)); Compare Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the 
American Courts in 2012: Twenty–Sixth Annual Survey, 61 AM. J. COMP. L.
217, 241–47 (2013) [hereinafter 2012 Survey], with Symeon C. Symeonides, 
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for different approaches to choice of law where parties have 
chosen to submit disputes to arbitration, as opposed to litiga-
tion, both in terms of the law that the parties may choose and 
the limits of that choice. Moreover, the approaches that State 
courts and legislators take to party autonomy often diverge. 
Differences in approach may lead, in practice, to two fora, 
confronted by the same dispute over the same contract, recog-
nizing and circumscribing the parties’ choice to different de-
grees. This naturally affects the outcome of the dispute and in-
centivizes parties to “shop around” for the best result by select-
ing a forum that the parties anticipate will apply its conflict of 
laws rules favorably.4 
Given the importance of this issue for international com-
merce, the Hague Conference on Private International Law 
(“Hague Conference”) has sought to create some consistency in 
approach to choice of law in international contracts. The draft 
Hague Principles on International Commercial Contracts5 (the 
                                                                                                             
Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2013: Twenty–Seventh Annual Sur-
vey, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter 2013 Survey]. 
 4. ANDREW S. BELL, FORUM SHOPPING AND VENUE IN TRANSNATIONAL 
LITIGATION 15 (2003). 
 5. It is anticipated that the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the 
Hague Conference will approve the Principles and their accompanying Com-
mentary, in their final form, in 2014 or at its meeting in 2015. The Council on 
General Affairs and Policy of the Hague Conference of April 2014 decided as 
follows 
2. The Council welcomed the work completed by the Working Group. 
The Council welcomed the text of the Hague Principles and the draft 
Commentary. The Council requested the Working Group to under-
take the editorial finalisation of the Principles in the two official lan-
guages of the Hague Conference. Members are invited to submit 
comments on the changes introduced in the draft Commentary after 
January 2014, bearing in mind the explanatory nature of the Com-
mentary. Any comments should be submitted in writing to the Per-
manent Bureau by 31 August 2014. The Working Group will then 
review those comments and finalise the Principles and the draft 
Commentary in both languages, where after the final version of the 
texts will be submitted to Members for approval in a written proce-
dure. The Principles and draft Commentary will be approved if no 
objection is raised within 60 days. 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, COUNCIL ON GENERAL 
AFFAIRS AND POLICY OF THE CONFERENCE, Conclusions and Recommendations 
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“Hague Principles”) and their accompanying Commentary, de-
veloped principally by a Working Group, seek to harmonize cer-
tain rules of private international law applicable to interna-
tional6 commercial7 contracts. 
The Hague Principles reinforce party autonomy and espouse 
a principle according to which the law chosen by the parties 
will govern the contract to the greatest possible extent, subject 
to clearly defined limits. Consistent with this principle, under 
                                                                                                             
adopted by the Council, April 8-10, 2014, para. 2 (2014), available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff2014concl_en.pdf. 
 6. Article 1(2) of the Hague Principles contains a negative definition to 
the effect that a contract is international unless “the parties have their estab-
lishments in the same State and the relationship of the parties and all other 
relevant elements, regardless of the chosen law, are connected only with that 
State.” Hague Conference on Private International Law, PERMANENT BUREAU, 
The Draft Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial 
Contracts, Prel. Doc. No. 6, art. 1(2) (Mar. 2014), available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gap2014pd06_en.pdf; Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, SPECIAL COMMISSION ON CHOICE OF LAW IN INT’L 
CONTRACTS, Draft Hague Principles as Approved by November 2012 Special 
Commission Meeting on Choice of Law in International Contracts and Rec-
ommendations For Commentary, Nov. 12-16, art.1(2) (2012) [hereinafter 2012 
Draft Hague Principles], available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/contracts2012principles_e.pdf; see also 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements, June 30, 2005 [hereinafter 2005 Hague Choice of Court 
Convention], available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt37en.pdf, which contains a similar 
definition. 
 7. Article 1(1) of the Hague Principles makes it clear that they apply to 
contracts “where each party is acting in the exercise of its trade or profes-
sion.” Article 1(1) also contains an express exclusion for consumer and em-
ployment contracts. The rationale for the decision to confine the Principles to 
business–to–business contracts was considered to be a sufficient counterbal-
ance to the promotion of party autonomy. The rationale is to enhance and 
establish party autonomy in international contracts, but only where both 
parties are professionals and therefore the risks from an abuse of party au-
tonomy are viewed as remote. See Hague Conference on Private International 
Law, COUNCIL ON GENERAL AFFAIRS AND POLICY OF THE CONFERENCE, Conclu-
sions and Recommendations Adopted by the Council, April 1-3, 2008, 1 (2008), 
available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff_concl08e.pdf; see also, 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, COUNCIL ON GENERAL 
AFFAIRS AND POLICY OF THE CONFERENCE, Conclusions and General Recom-
mendations Adopted by the Council, Mar. 31- April 3, 2009, 2 (2009) [herein-
after 2009 Conclusions and Recommendations], available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff_concl09e.pdf. 
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the Hague Principles, the parties may choose the law of a 
State, non-State rules of law, or a combination of these as the 
law governing their contract. 
The Hague Principles seek to harmonize approaches to choice 
of law in international contracts in two ways. First, they pro-
vide a universal model that lawmakers can use to create, sup-
plement, or develop their existing choice of law rules. Comple-
mented by their explanatory Commentary, the Hague Princi-
ples seek to serve as an international code of current “best 
practice” with respect to the recognition and limits of party au-
tonomy. Some provisions cement an internationally accepted 
approach. Other provisions reflect an approach that the Hague 
Conference considers to be the best practice for issues that of-
ten lack consensus, and novel solutions are occasionally intro-
duced. One of the best practice provisions is Article 2(4), which 
allows for the choice of a law that bears no connection to the 
parties or their transaction. The law of several jurisdictions in 
which the Hague Principles may have particular influence re-
quires that the chosen law be objectively connected to the 
transaction or to the parties. One of the Hague Principles’ in-
novative provisions is Article 6, which seeks to provide a prac-
tical solution to the widely recognized problem of “the battle of 
the forms,” where parties exchange standard forms, each con-
taining a choice of law clause (Article 6). 
Secondly, the Hague Principles seek to “level the playing 
field” between arbitration and litigation. Indeed, many jurisdic-
tions call for different approaches depending on the chosen dis-
pute settlement mechanism, both in terms of the law that the 
parties may choose and the limits of that choice. The Hague 
Principles allow parties, within the parameters set out by Arti-
cle 3, to choose not only State law but also rules of law—non-
State law—whether their eventual contractual disputes are 
subject to litigation or arbitration. The Hague Principles also 
ensure that the choice of the law by parties does not have the 
effect of excluding overriding mandatory rules or ordre public 
where applicable. 
Before exploring each of these aspects of the Hague Princi-
ples, and offering points of comparison with the conflict of laws 
rules applicable in the United States, the European Union, and 
China, this article traces the development of the Hague Princi-
ples. 
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE HAGUE PRINCIPLES 
A. History 
In 2006, the Hague Conference conducted a series of feasibil-
ity studies concerning the development of an instrument relat-
ing to choice of law in international commercial contracts. The-
se surveyed, existing rules and practices regarding choice of 
law agreements in the judicial8 and arbitral9 arenas. In addi-
tion, the Permanent Bureau—the Hague Conference’s Secre-
tariat—sent a questionnaire to members of the organization, 
the International Chamber of Commerce, and a large number 
of international arbitral centers and entities. The purpose of 
the questionnaire was to explore the use of choice of law 
agreements in current practice and the extent to which such 
agreements are respected, as well as to ascertain what provi-
sions would be required in a future instrument.10 
In 2009, following the outcome of and recommendations flow-
ing from the studies, the Council of General Affairs and Policy, 
the Hague Conference’s Governing Organ, mandated that the 
Permanent Bureau set up a Working Group to draft a nonbind-
ing international instrument for conflict rules applicable to in-
ternational contracts, which would later become the draft 
Hague Principles.11 The group consisted of specialists in pri-
                                                                                                             
 8. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Thalia Kruger, 
PERMANENT BUREAU, Feasibility Study on the Choice of Law in International 
Contracts – Overview and Analysis of Existing Instruments, Prel. Doc. No 22 
B (Mar. 2007) [hereinafter Prel. Doc. No 22 B], available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff_pd22b2007e.pdf. 
 9. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Ivana Radic, Feasibil-
ity Study on the Choice of Law in International Contracts – Special Focus on 
International Arbitration, ¶ 3, Prel. Doc. No 22 C (Mar. 2007) [hereinafter 
Arbitration Focus], available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff_pd22b2007e.pdf. 
 10. Hague Conference on Private International Law, PERMANENT BUREAU, 
Feasibility Study on the Choice of Law in International Contracts – Report on 
Work Carried Out and Preliminary Conclusions, ¶ 3, Prel. Doc. No 22 A (Mar. 
2007), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff_pd22a2007e.pdf; 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, PERMANENT BUREAU, Feasi-
bility Study on the Choice of Law in International Contracts – Report on Work 
Carried Out and Conclusions (Follow–up Note), ¶3, Prel. Doc. No 5 (Feb. 
2008) [hereinafter Follow–up Note], available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff_pd05e2008.pdf. 
 11. See 2009 Conclusions and Recommendations, supra note 7. 
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vate international law and international arbitration law drawn 
from different legal systems from all corners of the globe. In 
successive years, the Working Group, chaired by Professor 
Daniel Girsberger of Switzerland, met on various occasions. 
A Special Commission12 met in The Hague from November 
12–16, 2012, in order to examine the version of the Hague 
Principles submitted by the Working Group in 2011. The Spe-
cial Commission unanimously approved a revised form of the 
Hague Principles and made a number of recommendations re-
lating to the completion of the Hague Principles and their ac-
companying Commentary. In line with these recommendations, 
in April 2013 the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the 
Conference approved the Hague Principles, marking a signifi-
cant milestone in their development. The Council also gave a 
mandate to the Working Group to prepare a commentary. The 
Commentary accompanies each article of the Hague Principles 
and serves as an interpretative and explanatory tool for a bet-
ter understanding of the Hague Principles. Practical examples 
and scenarios are also provided to illustrate the application of 
the black letter rules. 
The Permanent Bureau consolidated the Commentary in No-
vember 2013 and circulated it to the Members and Observers of 
the Hague Conference for consultation. Several Members sub-
mitted suggested changes to the Commentary, which informed 
the discussions of the Working Group at its meeting in January 
2014. During this meeting, the Working Group established an 
Editorial Committee charged with finalizing the text of the 
Commentary with the assistance of the Permanent Bureau. 
                                                                                                             
 12. In 2012, the Council decided to establish a Special Commission to dis-
cuss the proposals of the Working Group and make recommendations as to 
future steps to be undertaken, including the decision to be taken on the form 
of the nonbinding instrument and the process through which the Commen-
tary would be completed. The Special Commission met from November 12–
16, 2012. Conclusion of the First Meeting of the Special Commission on Choice 
of Law in International Contracts, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Nov. 16, 2012), 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=events.details&year=2012&varevent=
292. 
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B. Form of the Hague Principles 
As a concise body of general principles that can be universal-
ly applied, the Hague Principles differ from other instruments 
developed by the Hague Conference. They do not constitute a 
binding convention that States, once signatory thereto, are 
obliged to incorporate into their domestic law. Although this 
nonbinding model is the first of its kind for the Hague Confer-
ence, its member states first approved it as a working method 
in 1980.13 
As a nonbinding instrument, the Hague Principles are suita-
bly adapted to their envisaged use.14 The Hague Principles are 
designed to assist lawmakers—whether legislators or courts—
in reforming the conflict of laws rules applicable to choice of 
law in international contracts. In particular, they may serve as 
a guide to States that do not sufficiently recognize party auton-
omy, refine the principle of party autonomy for those that do, 
and fill in the gaps for States that have only a partial set of es-
tablished conflict of laws rules governing international con-
tracts. The Hague Principles also provide guidance to contract-
ing parties and lawyers as to the relevant considerations and 
limits of a choice of law, the law and rules of law that they may 
choose, and the drafting of an effective choice of law agree-
                                                                                                             
 13.  
Recognizing that the use of certain methods of less binding effect 
than international conventions is in certain cases of a kind to pro-
mote the easier adoption and more wide–spread diffusion of common 
solutions, grants that the Conference, while maintaining as its prin-
cipal purpose the preparation of international conventions, may nev-
ertheless use other procedures of less binding effect, such as recom-
mendations or model laws, where, having regard to the circumstanc-
es, such procedures appear to be particularly appropriate. 
Hague Conference on Private International Law: Final Act, 19 INT’L LEGAL 
MATERIALS 1501, 1502 (1980). See also Georges Droz, La Conférence de La 
Haye de Droit International Privé et Les Méthodes d’Unification du Droit: 
Traités Internationaux ou Lois Modèles, 13 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT 
COMPARÉ 507, 507–21 (1961); “Conférence de La Haye de droit international 
Privé”, Répertoire international Dalloz, 1998, No 15. 
 14. The responses to questionnaires conducted as part of the Feasibility 
Study revealed that two-thirds of those member states that responded con-
sidered that a new instrument in this field would benefit contracting parties, 
courts, and arbitral tribunals. See Follow-up Note, supra note 10, ¶11. 
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ment.15 Courts and arbitral tribunals, within the parameters of 
their legal frameworks, may also be guided by the Hague Prin-
ciples when considering the validity and effects of a choice of 
law agreement and adjudicating a choice of law dispute.16 
The nonbinding nature of the instrument offers considerable 
advantages. One of the objectives of the current instrument is 
the acceptance of its principles in private international law 
codes, on all levels, and eventually a substantial degree of 
harmonization of what are currently disparate sets of national 
or regional rules in choice of law in international contracts. The 
nonbinding nature of the instrument, however, avoids any im-
mediate risk of conflict of standards, either with regional in-
struments such as the Rome I Regulation in the European Un-
ion or the Mexico Convention,17 or of any interference with the 
1955 Hague Sales Convention, the Hague Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Agency, or the 1986 Hague Sales Conven-
tion.18 
While the promulgation of a nonbinding instrument is novel 
for the Hague Conference, such instruments are relatively 
common. Indeed, the Hague Principles add to a growing num-
ber of nonbinding instruments of other organizations that have 
achieved particular success in developing and harmonizing law. 
See, for example, the influence of the United Nations Conven-
tion on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
on the respective development of sales and contract law. 
                                                                                                             
 15. Preliminary Document 6, March 2014, supra note 6. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See José Antonio Moreno Rodríguez & María Mercedes Albornoz, Re-
flections on the Mexico Convention in the Context of the Preparation of the 
Future Hague Instrument on International Contracts, 7 J. PRIVATE INT’l L. 
491, 493 (2011). 
 18. See generally Hague Conference on Private International Law, Conven-
tion on the Law Applicable to International Sales of Goods (June 15, 1955), 
available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=31; 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on the Law Ap-
plicable to Agency (Mar. 14, 1978) [hereinafter 1978 Convention], available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt27en.pdf; Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods (Dec. 22, 1986) [hereinafter 1986 Convention], 
available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt31en.pdf. 
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II. TOWARD A SOUND INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 
The Hague Principles seek to serve as a universal model in 
providing a uniform approach to the recognition and limits of 
the principle of party autonomy in choice of law for interna-
tional contracts. Part II analyzes various best practice and in-
novative provisions of the Hague Principles that are the subject 
of divergent approaches among legal systems. 
A. Express Choice v. Express and Tacit Choice 
The Hague Principles, underpinned by the principle of party 
autonomy, allow the parties to choose the law applicable to 
their contract. This is said to ensure certainty and predictabil-
ity within the context of the parties’ arrangement for several 
reasons. By designating the applicable law, parties know the 
legal regime according to which they perform their obliga-
tions,19 thus facilitating their intended transaction. By desig-
nating this law in advance of a dispute, parties are able to pre-
dict the way in which an eventual dispute will be resolved. This 
helps to achieve efficiency by reducing the costs of dispute reso-
lution.20 
One of the issues discussed at length during the development 
of the Hague Principles related to the manner in which parties 
could make a choice of law. Specifically, the question was 
whether an implicit choice of the applicable law would be ad-
missible or whether an explicit choice was necessary. Some in-
struments, such as the Chinese Law on the Application of Law 
to Foreign-Related Civil Relations, appear to limit party choice 
to an explicit choice of law.21 
                                                                                                             
 19. Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp v. Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] AC 50 
(U.K.). Lord Diplock relevantly said at 67 that contracts must be “made with 
reference to some system of private law which defines the obligations as-
sumed by the parties.” 
 20. Nygh, supra note 1, at 2–3; see also ADRIAN BRIGGS, AGREEMENTS ON 
JURISDICTION AND CHOICE OF LAW 140–42 (2008) (explaining how courts use 
choice of law clauses to determine which law to apply during dispute resolu-
tion). 
 21. Brooke Adele Marshall, Reconsidering the Proper Law of the Contract, 
13 MELB. J. INT’L L. 505, 526 (2013); Zhonghua Yenming Gongheguo Shewai 
Minshi Guanxi Falu Shiyong Fa (中华人民共和国涉外民事关系法律适用法) 
[Law on the Application of Law to Foreign-Related Civil Relations of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China] (Promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
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A comparative review shows that most legal systems recog-
nize an implicit choice of applicable law, albeit to varying de-
grees. Under some instruments, an implicit choice is construed 
restrictively. For instance, the Inter-American Convention on 
the Law Applicable to International Contracts22 provides that 
“[t]he parties’ agreement on this selection [of applicable law] 
must be express or, in the event that there is no express 
agreement, must be evident from the parties’ behavior and 
from the clauses of the contract, considered as a whole.”23 That 
phrasing invites a twofold analysis: subjective (behavior of the 
parties) and objective (clauses of the contract). 
Other instruments adopt a more flexible approach to the ad-
mission of an implicit choice. The Rome I Regulation requires 
that the choice be clearly demonstrated by the provisions of the 
contract or the circumstances of the case.24 The Civil Code of 
Quebec, for its part, requires only that the designation of the 
applicable law be inferred with certainty from the terms of the 
contract, without recourse to the circumstances surrounding 
the deed.25 Likewise, those twenty-three American states that 
follow the Restatement (Second) on the Conflict of Laws26 con-
sider that a reference to legal expressions or doctrines peculiar 
                                                                                                             
Cong., Oct. 28, 2010), arts 2-3. See also Guangjian Tu & Muchi Xu, Contrac-
tual Conflicts in the People’s Republic of China: The Applicable Law in the 
Absence of Choice, 7 J. PRIVATE INT’l L. 179, 182–83 (2011). 
 22. Inter–American Convention on the Law Applicable to International 
Contracts art. 7, Mar. 17, 1994, O.A.S.T.S. no. 78 [hereinafter The Mexico 
Convention]. 
 23. Id. 
 24. For a description of the background to adoption of the Rome I Regula-
tion, see Regulation 593/2008, art. 3(1), 2008 O.J. (L 177/6) (EC); compare 
with the Rome Convention, which is phrased more restrictively: “The choice 
must be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of 
the contract or the circumstances of the case,” Convention on the Law Appli-
cable to Contractual Relations art. 3, 1980 O.J. (L 266) [hereinafter Rome I 
Regulation]. For a description of the background to the adoption of the Rome 
I Regulation, see R. Wagner, op. cit. note 36, p. 378. 
 25. “A juridical act, whether or not it contains any foreign element, is gov-
erned by the law expressly designated in the act or the designation of which 
may be inferred with certainty from the terms of the act,” Civil Code of Qué-
bec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 3111 (Can.). 
 26. 2013 Survey, supra note 3, at 63–64. 
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to the law of a particular State is a valid implied choice.27 The 
Restatement (Second) requires courts to construe this rule nar-
rowly, so as to avoid admitting hypothetical choices of law.28 
The Supreme Court of Texas’s judgment in Sonat Exploration 
Co. v. Cudd Pressure Control Inc.29 is an example of this nar-
row approach to construction. This case concerned a dispute 
over a master service agreement contemplating operations in 
multiple locations. The agreement specified that where opera-
tions were performed on navigable waters, maritime law would 
apply, and where operations were performed in Texas or New 
Mexico, Texas law would apply. A dispute concerning indemni-
ty provisions arose in relation to an operation in Louisiana. 
The appellant argued before the Supreme Court of Texas that 
the parties had impliedly chosen Louisiana law to apply to op-
erations in Louisiana by virtue of (1) the use of the term “statu-
tory employer,” a legal term peculiar to the state of Louisiana, 
and (2) the inclusion of an additional insured provision in the 
agreement. 
The court rejected this argument on the basis that it was the 
indemnity provisions, not workers’ compensation, that were in 
issue. The court reasoned, first, that the indemnity provisions 
were printed in capital letters, a form peculiar to the state of 
Texas, indicating Texas law. Secondly, the additional insured 
provision was inserted as a means of avoiding the effect of Lou-
isiana’s indemnity law and could not be treated as “an affirma-
tive election of that law.” Thirdly, the court reasoned that it 
could not surmise from these implied references to Louisiana 
law that the parties intended Louisiana law to apply to the en-
tire master service agreement. 
The narrow approach to implied choice in Sonat accords with 
the approach to tacit choice envisaged by the Hague Principles. 
                                                                                                             
 27. Restatement, (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(2) cmt. a (1971) [here-
inafter Restatement]. See also Burchett v. MasTec North America Inc., 93 
P.3d 1247 (Mont. 2004); PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 1131–32 (5th 
ed. 2010). 
 28. Restatement, supra note 27, at 63-64. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
long recognized the possibility of an implied choice of law. Wayman v. 
Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 1 (1825); SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, AMERICAN PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 197 (2008). 
 29. Sonat Exploration Co. v. Cudd Pressure Control, Inc., 271 S.W.3d 228 
(Tex. 2008). 
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Article 4 of the Hague Principles requires that the parties’ 
choice “be made expressly or appear clearly from the provisions 
of the contract or the circumstances.” An express choice of law 
is usually included in the main contract and takes the form of 
an explicit reference to the law to which any disputes between 
the parties should be subject. An express choice of law can also 
be made orally. A tacit choice of law by the parties is one that 
is not expressly stated in the contract but is nonetheless a real 
choice of law. It must be clear that there is a real intention on 
the part of the parties that a certain law be applicable. A hypo-
thetical choice or presumed intention imputed to the parties is 
insufficient.30 
This approach acknowledges a tacit choice made by reference 
to elements of the contract or other relevant circumstances.31 
Generally, the terms of the contract are given priority. Howev-
er, either the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the 
case may conclusively indicate a tacit choice of law. As to rele-
vant terms of the contract, a choice of court clause or an arbi-
tration clause may, along with other factors, indicate that the 
parties intended the contract to be governed by the law of that 
forum. Article 4 clarifies that such a choice is not in itself 
equivalent to a choice of law. This express clarification avoids a 
common point of confusion in practice: the parties’ decision to 
choose a particular court or arbitral tribunal as the forum in 
which to resolve disputes does not automatically mean that the 
parties have selected the law of that forum as the law govern-
ing the contract.32 The particular circumstances of the case 
that may indicate the intention of the parties as to the applica-
ble law may include their conduct and other factors surround-
ing the conclusion of the contract. Previous or related contracts 
between the parties containing an express choice of law clause 
                                                                                                             
 30. For arguments in favor of express choice only, see PERMANENT BUREAU 
OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, Choice of Law in 
International Commercial Contracts: Hague Principles?, 15 UNIFORM L. REV. 
883, 895 (2010), but cf. Jan L. Neels & Eesa A. Fredericks, Tacit Choice of 
Law in the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Contracts, 44 
DE JURE L. J. 101,101–10 (2011), and Marshall, supra note 21 at 517. 
 31. See Nygh supra note 1, at 113–20 (providing a survey of the indicators 
of tacit choice). 
 32. Cf. The former presumption under English law of qui elegit judicem 
elegit jus. Tzortzis v. Monark Line A/B, (1968) 1 W.L.R. 406, 413 (CA). 
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in favor of the same law may also indicate that the parties in-
tended to have that law apply to all of their contractual rela-
tions. 
B. Absence of a Connection Between the Contract or the Parties 
and the Designated Law 
Article 2(4) of the Hague Principles establishing that the par-
ties’ freedom to choose the applicable law is not circumscribed 
by the requirement of a connection, be it geographical or oth-
erwise, between the contract or the parties and the chosen law. 
This provision is designed to reflect the reality of largely delo-
calized commercial transactions brought about by globaliza-
tion. The provision also reflects the fact that parties may 
choose a particular law for a number of reasons: its neutrality 
inter se,33 because it is highly developed in the type of transac-
tion or transactions contemplated by the contract, or because it 
is most familiar to their legal advisors on whose advice the par-
ties rely. 
In allowing the parties to choose the law applicable to their 
contract, without requiring a particular connection, the Hague 
Principles’ methodology is consistent with many modern in-
struments relating to the law applicable to contracts.34 For ex-
ample, Article 7(1) of the 1955 Hague Convention on the Law 
Applicable to International Sales of Goods (the “1955 Hague 
Sales Convention”) promotes the parties’ freedom without re-
quiring any connection between the chosen law and the parties’ 
transaction. A similar provision exists for choice of court 
agreements in the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention. 
Furthermore, neither the Rome I Regulation nor the Mexico 
Convention requires a connection between the chosen law and 
the contractual situation. 
The Hague Principles differ, however, from the choice of law 
rules in some legal systems that accept party autonomy, but 
which require an objective, substantial connection between the 
                                                                                                             
 33. Selecting a neutral forum is what game theory labels the second best 
strategy. Choosing the law and forum of an unfamiliar State imposes an ad-
ditional cost on both parties and ensures that neither party has an informa-
tional advantage. See Stefan Voegenauer, Regulatory Competition through 
Choice of Contract Law and Choice of Forum in Europe: Theory and Evidence, 
1 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 13, 24–25 (2013). 
 34. Nygh, supra note 1, at 58–60. 
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transaction and the chosen law.35 For example, the Restate-
ment (Second) methodology, which is followed in the majority
of American states,36 calls for a substantial relationship be-
tween the law chosen and the parties or the transaction in a
case where there is no other reasonable basis for the parties’
choice, but only for issues which the parties could not have re-
solved by an explicit provision in their contract directed to that
issue.37 The Restatement (Second) subjects issues within the
contractual power of the parties to the chosen law irrespective
of whether that law is connected to the parties or their transac-
tion.38
                                                                                                             
35. It was recommended, following the Special Commission, that this re-
quirement be referred to in the Commentary. See 2012 Draft Hague Princi-
ples, supra note 6. The Restatement (Second)’s substantial relationship re-
quirement restricts party autonomy in an instrument which applies to a
broad range of contracts, including those involving presumptively vulnerable
parties such as consumers and employees. The Hague Principles, which do
not call for a substantial connection, arguably can afford to be more liberal
because these sorts of vulnerable parties are excluded from the scope of the
instrument. The Hague Principles only apply to commercial contracts. See
generally, SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CODIFYING CHOICE OF LAW AROUND THE
WORLD 164 – 65 (2014).
36. The Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) has been adopted in all
American states and takes precedence over the Restatement (Second) for con-
tracts falling within its scope. Courts, however, have tended to equate Section
1–105 of the former version of the U.C.C. with the Restatement (Second),
viewing the two as interchangeable. Symeonides, supra note 28, at 216. Con-
sidering Section 1-301 of the Revised U.C.C. adopts the language of the for-
mer Section 1-105 (The American Law Institute, 85th Annual Meeting Pro-
gram, 19-21 May 2008, p. 8, No 3; Keith A. Rowley, The Often Imitated, But
(Still) Not Yet Duplicated, Revised UCC Article 1, Nev. L.J. 1, 8 (2011), avail-
able at http://www.law.unlv.edu/faculty/rowley/RA1.081511.pdf), there is 
nothing to suggest that Section 1-301 of the Revised U.C.C. will change the
methodology that courts employ in those states.
37. Restatement, supra note 27, § 187(2) provides that
The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual
rights and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one
which the parties could not have resolved by explicit provision in
their agreement directed to that issue, unless …(a) the chosen state
has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and
there is no other reasonable basis for the parties’ choice …
For a breakdown of those states that employ the Restatement (Second) meth-
odology, see 2013 Survey, supra note 3, at 62-64.
38. Restatement, supra note 27, § 187(1).
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A number of states have abandoned the substantial connec-
tion requirement of the Restatement (Second).39 In other states, 
the requirement’s interpretation has been relaxed over time. 
One commentator has suggested that the cases premised upon 
it are so few that they ought to be regarded as exceptions.40 A 
very recent case that applied a strict interpretation to the re-
quirement is Contour Design, Inc. v. Chance Mold Steel Co., 
Ltd.41 This case concerned a dispute over a nondisclosure 
agreement (“NDA”), drafted by a lawyer in Colorado, contain-
ing a choice of law clause selecting the law of Colorado. The 
Taiwanese respondent was the manufacturer of the goods of 
the appellant, a New Hampshire corporation. Under New 
Hampshire’s choice of law rules, the methodology of the Re-
statement (Second) applied to the dispute.42 The Court set 
aside the parties’ choice, holding that there was an insignifi-
cant relationship between the NDA and the law of Colorado, 
the only alleged connection being the location of the drafting 
lawyer, and instead applied New Hampshire law.43 Presuma-
bly, the Court did not see the familiarity of the drafting lawyer 
with Colorado law to be a “reasonable basis” for the parties’ 
choice in accordance with §187(2)(a). 
                                                                                                             
 39. See for example, Louisiana Civil Code Art. 3540 and Oregon Revised 
Statutes § 81.120. See also Texas Business & Commerce Code § 35.51 (c), 
New York General Obligations Law § 5-1401.735, California Civil Code § 
1646.5 and Illinois Compiled Statute 105/5-5, which apply to choice of law in 
transactions above a monetary threshold. 
 40. See RÜHL, supra note 1, at 14 n.50. 
 41. Contour Design, Inc. v. Chance Mold Steel Co., Ltd., 693 F.3d 102 (1st 
Cir. 2012). 
 42. As the United States Federal Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
was sitting in diversity jurisdiction, it applied the choice of law rules of the 
forum state, New Hampshire. New Hampshire follows the Restatement (Se-
cond) choice of law methodology. See 2013 Survey, supra note 3, at 63. “Under 
New Hampshire law, ‘[w]here parties to a contract select the law of a particu-
lar jurisdiction to govern their affairs, that choice will be honored if the con-
tract bears any significant relationship to that jurisdiction.”‘ In re Scott, 160 
N.H. 354, 999 A.2d 229, 237–38 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Hobin 
v. Coldwell Banker Residential Affiliates, 144 N.H. 626, 744 A.2d 1134, 1137 
(2000); See also Contour Design, Inc., 693 F.3d 102. 
 43. Contour Design, Inc., 693 F.3d 102. It is unclear on the face of the rea-
sons for judgment whether the Court applied New Hampshire as the law 
most closely connected to the contract in accordance with § 188 of the Re-
statement Second or as the law of the forum. 
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While a “significant minority” of American states continue, in 
theory, to employ the Restatement (First) methodology44—
which does not allow parties to choose the law applicable to 
their contract45—a number of modern Restatement (First) 
courts have seemingly broken with the traditional methodolo-
gy. Instead, they have applied loosely a §187 Restatement (Se-
cond) type analysis to choice of law clauses referring to the law 
of the place with the most significant relationship to the con-
tract.46 
The requirement that the chosen law have a significant, ob-
jective connection to the parties or their contract can be likened 
to the theory of localization in a civil law context, which was 
fervently defended by Batiffol during the early nineteenth cen-
tury.47 According to this theory, the chosen law is excluded 
when it is unrelated to the objective center of gravity of the 
contract. The rationale behind the approach, under which a 
connection with the chosen law is required, is to police party 
autonomy so as to prevent fraude à la loi. As it is known in 
French, fraude à la loi focuses on the motives of the party who, 
                                                                                                             
 44. Symeonides, supra note 3, at 63. 
 45. The principal objection to the ability of the parties to choose the law 
applicable to their contract is that it “practically creates a legislative body 
from any two persons who choose to get together and contract.” JOSEPH H. 
BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1079–80 (1935). This is based 
on Beale’s and Dicey’s vested rights theory according to which, a particular 
contract is the trigger for the vesting of a right in a given location. A.V. 
DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONFLICT OF 
LAWS 17–25 (5th ed. 1932); William M. Richman & David Riley, The First 
Restatement of Conflict of Laws on the Twenty–Fifth Anniversary of its Suc-
cessor: Contemporary Practice in Traditional Courts, 56 MD. L. REV. 1196, 
1197–98 (1997). The law of the place where the right vests then controls the 
content of the right. In the case of contracts, Restatement (First) courts tradi-
tionally applied the law of the place where the contract was formed to control 
the content of contractual rights. Id. at 1206–13. 
 46. Richman, supra note 45, at 1206-13. 
 47. HENRI BATIFFOL, ASPECTS PHILOSOPHIQUES DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
PRIVÉ 83 (1956); HENRI BATIFFOL, LES CONFLITS DE LOIS EN MATIÈRE DE 
CONTRATS 38 (1938). For a discussion of this theory in English, see HORACIO 
A. GRIGERA NAÓN, CHOICE–OF–LAW PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 
155–57 (1992). 
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by its choice of law, seeks to avoid the application of another 
law that is objectively applicable to the contract.48 
The Hague Principles address, to a large extent, the concerns 
attending fraude à la loi through application of the exceptions 
of ordre public and overriding mandatory laws provided for in 
Article 11, which limit party autonomy. The exceptions were 
considered to be a sufficient counterbalance to the ability of the 
parties to choose an unconnected law to apply to their contract. 
This is especially so considering parties are likely to choose a 
neutral law because they have not been able to agree on the 
application of either of their own legal systems.49 
C. The Battle of the Forms 
A significant development at the November 2012 Special 
Commission meeting was the adoption of a provision on the 
vexed problem of the “the battle of the forms” or, more specifi-
cally, the question of the prevailing law—if any—when both 
parties make choices of law via the exchange of “standard 
form” contracts. 50 
At a national level, there are at least four different approach-
es to the battle of the forms.51 Under Dutch law, the standard 
terms first used prevail (“first shot rule”); whereas under Eng-
lish law and the Contract Law of the People’s Republic of Chi-
na,52 the standard terms referred to last prevail (“last shot 
rule”). In other jurisdictions, such as France and Germany, con-
flicting terms are to be ignored entirely (“knock out rule”). The 
United States’ Uniform Commercial Code applies a hybrid so-
                                                                                                             
 48. HENRI BATIFFOL & PAUL LAGARDE, TRAITÉ DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
PRIVÉ 596 (8th ed. 1993). 
 49. See D. MARTINY, MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BGB Art. 27, No., 28 
(4th ed. 2006).  
 50. This problem, which is not canvassed here, is also experienced in a 
jurisdictional context. For a discussion of the problem concerning conflicting 
jurisdiction clauses, see Richard Garnett, Co-existing and Conflicting Juris-
diction and Arbitration Clauses, 9 J. OF PRIVATE INT’L L. 361 (2013). 
 51. Thomas Kadner Graziano, Solving the Riddle of Conflicting Choice of 
Law Clauses in Battle of Forms Situations: The Hague Solution, 14 Y.B. 
PRIVATE INT’L L. 71, 74 (2012/2013). 
 52. Zhonghua Yenming Gongheguo Hetong Fa (中华人民共和国合同法) 
[Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] (Promulgated by the Stand-
ing Comm. Nati’l People’s Cong., 15 Mar. 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999), Art. 
19. 
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lution, adopting aspects of the first shot rule, last shot rule, 
and knock out rule.53 Other jurisdictions do not yet have a solu-
tion for the issue of conflicting standard terms.54 
A special drafting group, led by the delegation of Switzerland, 
in consultation with the Drafting Committee, considered this 
matter. Two drafting options, one more concise than the other, 
were set out and presented to the Special Commission. The 
shorter text was preferred and was widely considered by the 
experts present at the Special Commission to be an elegant and 
comprehensive solution to the problem of conflicting choice of 
law clauses. 
Article 6 of the Hague Principles provides that whether or 
not the parties have agreed to a choice of law is to be deter-
mined by the law that was purportedly agreed to. If both par-
ties’ standard terms designate the same applicable law, or if 
only one party’s standard terms contain a choice of law clause, 
Article 6, paragraph 1(a) applies and “the law that was pur-
portedly agreed to” resolves the question of whether the parties 
“agreed” on the applicable law. Where standard terms used by 
the parties contain conflicting choice of law clauses, Article 6, 
paragraph 1(b) applies and the law that was purportedly 
agreed to resolves the question of whether the parties agreed 
on the applicable law.55 If under these laws the same standard 
terms prevail, then the law designated in the prevailing stand-
ard terms governs the contract as the applicable law. 
This provision attempts to bring clarity to the divergent ap-
proaches that exist under national law. Complemented by the 
Commentary, which contains illustrations of potential instanc-
es of a battle of the forms and how these situations would be 
resolved by the Hague Principles, Article 6 of the Hague Prin-
ciples may prove to be a significant contribution to the devel-
opment of an international standard for a highly complicated 
legal issue. 
                                                                                                             
 53. U.C.C. § 2–207 (1958); Graziano, supra note 51, at 79. 
 54. Graziano, supra note 51, at 74–82. 
 55. For an analysis of how the provisions of Article 6 of the Hague Princi-
ples might apply where the parties have chosen rules of law as the applicable 
law under Article 3, see Brooke Adele Marshall, The UNIDROIT Principles: 
A Dash of Pragmatism in the Non-State Law Pudding?, (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with the authors). 
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D. Partial and Multiple Choice of Law 
The process of separating the elements comprising a legal re-
lationship so as to subject them to the laws of several different 
legal systems is known as dépeçage.56 Some commentators ar-
gue that dépeçage ought to be used restrictively in a contractu-
al setting, asserting that it should only apply to contractual 
transactions that are clearly severable.57 Notwithstanding, sev-
eral instruments,58 including the Resolution of the Institute of 
International Law on “The Autonomy of the Parties in Interna-
tional Contracts between Private Persons or Entities,”59 the 
Rome I Regulation,60 and the Restatement (Second),61 permit 
dépeçage of a single contract.62 Article 2(2) of the Hague Princi-
ples adopts a similar approach, allowing the parties to choose 
different laws to apply to separate elements of their contract or 
to choose a body of law to apply to only part of their contract. 
The Hague Principles reserve to the parties the option to use 
this process as a means of giving the greatest scope to party 
autonomy.63 The Commentary, however, notes the risk of con-
                                                                                                             
 56. Paul Lagarde, Le Dépeçage en Droit International Privé des Contrats, 1 
RIV. DI DIR. INT. PRIV E PROC., 649, 649 (1975) (It.). 
 57. Jean-Michel Jacquet, Contrats, in RÉPERTOIRE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL, 1, 13, ¶ 57, (Dominique Carreau et al. eds., Dalloz 2011). 
According to Professor Bernard Audit, this restrictive view is inspired by the 
concern to observe the statutory establishments and the fear of imbalance 
between the parties. BERNARD AUDIT, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 685 (5th 
ed. 2008). 
 58. In relation to arbitration, see Arbitration Focus, supra note 9, at 15. 
 59. Institute of International Law, The Autonomy of Private Parties in 
International Contracts between Private Persons or Entities, Sess. of Basel, 
art. 7 (Aug. 31, 1991) (providing that “the parties may choose the law to be 
applied to the whole or one or more parts of the contract.”). 
 60. Rome I Regulation, supra note 24, at 10 (“The parties can select the 
law applicable to the whole or a part only of the contract.”). 
 61. Restatement, supra note 27, § 187(2) cmt 1. 
 62. Regarding the discussions of this matter in connection with the 1986 
Convention, see Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention 
on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Dec. 
22, 1986), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt31en.pdf. 
 63. Dépeçage is a “form of accomplishment of contractual intent.” Lagarde, 
supra note 48, at 652; RICHARD PLENDER & MICHAEL WILDERSPIN, THE 
EUROPEAN CONTRACTS CONVENTION: THE ROME CONVENTION ON THE CHOICE OF 
LAW FOR CONTRACTS 100-01 (2d ed. 2001) (stating that “dépeçage is simply a 
manifestation (or the logical conclusion) of the principle of party autonomy.”); 
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tradiction or inconsistency that may result from dépeçage in 
the determination of the parties’ rights and obligations. Parties 
should ensure that their choices “are logically consistent.”64 
The parties may also make a partial choice of law in accord-
ance with Article 2(2)(i). Where the parties choose a law to ap-
ply to only part of their contract, the remainder of the con-
tract—in default of a choice of law applicable to it—is governed 
by the law that would be applicable in the absence of a choice. 
As the Hague Principles do not provide rules for identifying the 
applicable law in the absence of a choice by the parties, this 
issue is left to be determined by the law of the forum. The par-
ties may also choose several bodies of law to govern different 
aspects of their contract pursuant to Article 2(2)(ii). Partial or 
multiple choices of law may relate to, for example, the currency 
applicable to the contract, or clauses relating to specific obliga-
tions, such as obtaining governmental authorizations. 
These are but a few illustrations of the solutions proposed by 
the Hague Principles. This Article now addresses the way in 
which the Hague Principles harmonize the approach to choice 
of law from the angle of the different dispute resolution mech-
anisms available to the parties. 
III. LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD BETWEEN COURTS AND 
ARBITRATION: EXPANDING DISPUTE RESOLUTION OPTIONS FOR 
PARTIES TO INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 
In recent years, there has been a global trend, commercially, 
judicially, and legislatively, to favor arbitration.65 This phe-
nomenon has led some jurisdictions to a tacit or overt policy 
preference for arbitration, and a trend to craft legislation ac-
                                                                                                             
Marc. Ekelmans, Le Dépeçage du Contrat dans la Convention de Rome du 19 
Juin 1980 sur la Loi Applicable aux Obligations Contractuelles, in MÉLANGES 
OFFERTS À RAYMOND VANDER ELST 247, 247 (1986). 
 64. JAMES FAWCETT & JANEEN M. CARRUTHERS, CHESHIRE, NORTH AND 
FAWCETT: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 691 (14th ed. 2008) (“[C]hoices must 
be logically consistent”]. Cf. Jacquet, supra note 57 (“the only limit of dé-
peçage is one of practice: the application of several laws to a single contract 
should not rupture its consistency.”). Report on the Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1980 O.J. (C 282) 1, 17 (E.C.) (by Mar-
io Giuliano and Paul Lagarde). 
 65. Stavros Brekoulakis, The Notion of the Superiority of Arbitration 
Agreements over Jurisdiction Agreements, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 341, 341 (2007). 
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cordingly.66 Domestic legislation implementing the 1958 New 
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards and the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration has in turn “reinforced 
the legal status and position of arbitration,”67 and enhanced its 
desirability as a dispute resolution mechanism in the eyes of 
commercial parties. Other commentators suggest that a prefer-
ence for arbitration on the part of commercial actors is mis-
placed and that many are still attracted to the transparency, 
speed, and impartiality offered by judicial processes.68 
With a view to subordinating any judicial or legislative pref-
erence in favor of arbitration to the will of the parties, the 
Hague Principles seek to harmonize the approach to choice of 
law between litigation and arbitration, while nonetheless ac-
knowledging the different normative spaces in which State 
courts and arbitral tribunals operate. Below are several exam-
ples of how these differences converge under the Hague Princi-
ples. 
A. Choice of Non-State Rules of Law 
Where a dispute is to be resolved by litigation before a State 
court, most regimes of private international law require that 
the parties’ choice of law clause designate a State system of 
law. Choice of norms or rules of law emanating from non-State 
sources has typically only been contemplated in an arbitral 
context. The phrase “rules of law” is derived from existing arbi-
tration sources including State arbitration legislation, model 
arbitration laws, and private institutional arbitration rules.69 
Article 3 of the Hague Principles widens the scope of the party 
autonomy to allow parties to choose non-State rules of law to 
govern their contract in circumstances where their dispute is 
subject to litigation. Where the law of the forum restricts party 
                                                                                                             
 66. Garnett, supra note 50, at 361-62. 
 67. Id. at 362. 
 68. TREVOR HARTLEY, CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS UNDER THE EUROPEAN 
AND INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 5 (2013). 
 69. See U.N. Comm. On Int’l Trade L. [“UNCITRAL”], UNCITRAL Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration, June 21, 1985, U.N. Doc. 
A/40/17 (1985); International Chamber of Commerce, ICC Rules of Arbitra-
tion, art. 21(1), 28(1) (2012). 
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choice to systems of State law, however, a choice of non-State 
rules of law will be set aside. 
An earlier version of the draft Hague Principles, as originally 
proposed by the Working Group, extended party choice to non-
State rules of law through a “bright-line” rule which provided 
that “a reference [in these Principles] to law includes rules of 
law.”70 This broad, open ended formulation was criticized by 
some experts at the Special Commission on the basis that it 
might lead to a proliferation of unfair, unilateral rules of law 
dictated by the party with the greatest bargaining power.71 
This could have adverse effects on weaker or unsuspecting par-
ties. There was also a concern that allowing parties to employ 
any rules of law could make the judicial resolution of disputes 
more time consuming and complex, given the array of potential 
rules of law that could be applicable. 
On the other hand, the experts who favored retaining the 
formulation suggested by the Working Group stressed that the 
fundamental purpose of the Hague Principles—the promotion 
of party autonomy—ought to extend to the freedom to choose 
rules of law. Several experts noted, in response to the concern 
about vulnerable parties, that many State laws already con-
tained substantive provisions that prevent the application of 
unfair terms, and that parties transacting internationally in a 
commercial context should be considered capable of choosing 
the law or rules of law applicable to their transaction. Fur-
thermore, if the Hague Principles disallowed the designation of 
rules of law, or remained silent as to whether parties could des-
ignate them, this would conflict with the promotion of uniform 
and harmonized choice of law principles. 
After significant discussion and various constructive pro-
posals, the experts reached a compromise. Article 3 of the 
Hague Principles, in its current form that allows parties to 
choose only rules of law that are “neutral and balanced,” seeks 
to address the concern of unequal bargaining power leading to 
the application of unfair or inequitable rules of law. Moreover, 
the requirement that parties select a “set of rules” that are 
                                                                                                             
 70. See 2012 Draft Hague Principles, supra note 6. 
 71. Cecilia Fresnedo de Aguirre, Party Autonomy – a Blank Cheque?, 17 
UNIFORM L. REV. 655, 680 (2012). 
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“generally accepted” seeks to dissuade parties from choosing 
vague or uncertain categories of rules of law. 
The Commentary elaborates on the elements comprising Ar-
ticle 3. As to the first (a “set of rules” that are “generally ac-
cepted”), the Commentary provides several examples—
including the UNIDROIT Principles on International Commer-
cial Contracts and the substantive rules of the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(1980, Vienna) (“CISG”)—as a free standing set of contract 
rules and not as a nationalized version of the CISG contained 
in the law of a CISG Contracting State. Second, the Commen-
tary explains that the requirement of “neutrality” calls for a 
body of rules that are capable of resolving problems commonly 
encountered in transnational contracts. Finally, the require-
ment that the rules be “balanced” reflects the presumption that 
the parties exercise the same negotiating power. Accordingly, 
rules of law that are drafted to confer an advantage on one of 
the contracting parties are excluded under Article 3. 
To ensure that all aspects of the parties’ contract are gov-
erned by an applicable law, the Commentary urges parties to 
supplement their chosen rules of law by the choice of a body of 
State law. This “gap filling” law applies to those aspects of the 
contract to which the applicable rules do not extend.72 
B. Overriding Mandatory Laws and ordre public 
1. Definitions 
The Hague Principles acknowledge that certain qualifications 
to party autonomy are necessary in the field of international 
commercial contracts, whether the parties’ dispute is being re-
solved by arbitration or litigation. The most important qualifi-
cations to the application of parties’ chosen law are those con-
tained in Article 11. The purpose of Article 11 is to ensure that 
the choice of the law by parties to an international commercial 
contract does not have the effect of excluding overriding man-
datory laws or the rules of ordre public. It is clear that overrid-
ing mandatory laws and public policy are “closely connected” 
and are united in the result that they achieve, namely, a set-
ting aside of the chosen law to the extent of an inconsistency 
                                                                                                             
 72. See generally Marshall, supra note 55. 
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with the law against which it is being assessed. These excep-
tions affect the applicable law differently, however, and as such 
call for distinct inquiries. 
Ordre public concerns situations in which application of the 
chosen law is displaced because its application in a particular 
case offends the fundamental policies of the forum or another 
State whose law would apply to the contract, absent the par-
ties’ choice. The exception concentrates on the content of the 
foreign, chosen law, which is otherwise properly applicable, to 
set that law aside. The chosen law is only displaced to the ex-
tent of the incompatibility with the fundamental policies of the 
forum or of the State whose law would apply in the absence of 
choice.73 The threshold is high in that the application of the 
chosen law must violate a fundamental policy of the forum. The 
chosen law cannot be displaced simply because it implements a 
different legislative policy and adopts an approach different 
from that of the law of the forum. 
Overriding mandatory provisions are those positive rules of 
the lex fori, or of a third legal system, that are essential to 
safeguard the public interests of the relevant legal system. The 
relevant inquiry, when one talks about overriding mandatory 
laws of the forum, is on those provisions themselves; that is, 
provisions which, on their proper construction, take priority 
over the chosen law, although the chosen law is still applied as 
far as possible consistently with the overriding mandatory pro-
vision.74 The law of the forum determines whether and when 
the overriding mandatory provisions of a third legal system are 
to be taken into account. 
Interestingly, the Hague Principles address public policy and 
overriding mandatory provisions in a single article. This ap-
proach is a departure from the Hague Conference’s traditional 
approach, which has been to separate those two concepts.75 It is 
                                                                                                             
 73. See Preliminary Document 6, March 2014, supra note 6. 
 74. Id. 
 75. E.g., 1978 Convention, supra note 18, art. 16-17 and 1986 Convention, 
supra note 18, art. 17–18. See also Hague Convention on Private Internation-
al Law, Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Se-
curities Held with an Intermediary, art. 11 (July 5, 2006). 
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also a departure from the prevailing approach to the treatment 
of these issues in the European Union.76 
2. In an Arbitral Setting 
Article 11(5) deals with the qualifications to the application 
of parties’ chosen law in circumstances where the parties have 
agreed to submit disputes to arbitration. It envisages that the 
Hague Principles shall not prevent the tribunal from applying 
or taking into account both overriding mandatory provisions 
and ordre public of any law other than the law chosen by the 
parties if the tribunal is required to do so.77 While the formula-
tion in paragraph 5 may seem repetitive, it clearly conveys the 
intended meaning: that the first and second limbs, relating to 
overriding mandatory provisions and public policy, respective-
ly, are to be treated separately. 
The Hague Principles do not comment on the circumstances 
under which an arbitral tribunal might be required to have re-
gard toward such matters, for this is a fraught issue.78 From a 
contractualist perspective,79 arbitral tribunals operate within 
their own normative space and are therefore not required to 
vindicate the mandatory laws or protect the ordre public of a 
particular State, other than those forming part of the law cho-
sen by the parties. Within the paradigm of jurisdictional theo-
ry, however, arbitration is still very much tied to the Westpha-
lian model, the nation-state being the source of legitimacy for 
the exercise of the tribunal’s powers and the enforcement of an 
award, which the tribunal renders.80 In accordance with this 
theory, arbitrators are required to have regard to the mandato-
ry laws of both the seat where the arbitral powers are exer-
                                                                                                             
 76. See Monika Pauknerová, Mandatory Rules and Public Policy in Inter-
national Contract Law, 11 ERA F. 29, 29-43 (2010). 
 77. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 635-37 (1985). 
 78. See generally, Andrew Barraclough & Jeff Waincymer, Mandatory 
Rules in International Commercial Arbitration, 6 MELB. J. INT’L L. 205, 208 
(2005). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See P A Keane, C.J., Fed. Court of Austl., The Prospects for Interna-
tional Arbitration in Australia: Meeting the Challenge of Regional Forum 
Competition or Our House Our Rules (Sept. 25, 2012), available at 
http://www.amtac.org.au/assets/media/Papers/AMAMTACAddressKeaneCJ25
September-2012.pdf. 
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cised81 and the place of enforcement where the award will take 
effect. Somewhere in the middle of these two theories is a hy-
bridized conception of arbitration.82
Without equivocating on any one of these theories, or on any 
hybrid conception, the Commentary to the Hague Principles 
cites as an example the situation where a tribunal is acting in 
accordance with arbitral rules that require it to make every 
reasonable effort to render an “enforceable award.”83 This may 
entail recourse to the overriding mandatory provisions of the 
State in which the award creditor is likely to seek enforcement. 
A further example might be where arbitrators are called upon 
to decide the enforceability of a contract for the payment of cor-
rupt funds. In such a case, the arbitrators may have regard to 
the overriding mandatory laws of the place of performance of 
the contract.84
Article 11 does not compel arbitrators to apply overriding 
mandatory laws of the forum or rules of ordre public. Rather, it 
calls on arbitrators to exercise their discretion as to whether 
and in what circumstances they ought to do so. This is distin-
guishable from the provisions of Article 11 applying to State 
courts (paragraphs 1 to 4) that do compel State courts to have 
regard to such rules. 
3. In Litigation 
The first two paragraphs of Article 11 deal with overriding 
mandatory laws, which qualify the application of parties’ cho-
sen law in circumstances where the parties’ dispute is being 
litigated before a State court. Article 11(1) and Article 11(2) 
deal respectively with the application of the “overriding man-
datory provisions of the law of the forum” and the “overriding 
mandatory provisions of another law.” It was suggested during 
the meeting of the Special Commission that the first two para-
                                                                                                             
 81. Barraclough, supra note 78, at 210-11. Although the powers may, in 
reality, be exercised in the venue, which may differ from the seat of the arbi-
tration.
82. See id. at 210. 
83. See, e.g., The Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of 
Commerce, art. 41 (2012). 
84. See generally, S Z Tang, Corruption in International Commercial Arbi-
tration, Presentation at the Journal of Private International Law Conference, 
(Sept. 12 – 13, 2013) (attended by the authors). 
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graphs of Article 11 be amalgamated to preserve the brevity 
and succinctness of the Hague Principles. The Special Commis-
sion, however, agreed to retain the two separate paragraphs, 
principally on the basis that where the Hague Principles are 
used as a model, legislators may wish to make separate refer-
ence to the role of overriding mandatory provisions of the fo-
rum and of a third country. Under the Hague Principles, it is 
for the law of the forum to determine whether and when the 
overriding mandatory provisions of a third legal system are 
taken into account. This provision should prompt policymakers 
to enumerate expressly the circumstances in which the overrid-
ing mandatory provisions should displace the law chosen by the 
parties. 
The third and fourth paragraphs of Article 11 deal with rules 
of ordre public, which similarly qualify the application of par-
ties’ chosen law in circumstances where the parties’ dispute is 
being litigated before a State court. Article 11(3) requires State 
courts to apply the ordre public of the forum, and Article 11(4) 
leaves it to the law of the forum to determine the relevance, if 
any, of the ordre public of the State whose law would be appli-
cable in the absence of a choice of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Hague Principles reflect the overarching mandate of the 
Hague Conference: “[T]he progressive unification of the rules of 
private international law.”85 When implemented at the national 
or regional level, the Hague Principles will contribute to 
providing greater cohesion between approaches to choice of law 
rules relating to international contracts. The implementation of 
the Hague Principles should also alert parties to the issue of 
the law applicable to their contract, prompting them to plan 
their cross-border transactions more effectively. Whether these 
objectives will be met remains to be seen. It will be interesting 
to monitor the possible implementation and subsequent impact 
of such common international standards around the world.86 
                                                                                                             
 85. Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law art. 1, 
July 15, 1955, COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS (1951-2009) 2 (Hague Conference 
on Private International Law ed. 2009). 
 86. To our knowledge, the first State to formally consider implementing 
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For now, academic debate generated by symposia, such as the 
Brooklyn Law School Symposium, “What Law Governs Inter-
national Commercial Contracts? Divergent Doctrines and the 
New Hague Principles,” is indispensable to ensuring that the 
future instrument is rigorously reviewed by those who may be 
its ultimate users. 
                                                                                                             
guay. Legislation is currently before the Paraguayan Congress. See Para-
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336. 
